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The (Dis-) Embedded Firm. 
Complex structure and dynamics in inter-firm relations: 
Adding institutionalization as a Veblenian dimension to the Coase-Williamson approach – 
An emerging triangular organizational space 
 
 
Abstract 
The increasing complexity of the environment of firms, of strategic interaction, and emergent informal 
institutional network cooperation, seems to outreach the traditional Coase-Williamson transaction-cost 
framework with its market-hierarchy dichotomy. We propose to take the complexity of nowadays’ firm 
ecologies more serious and integrate an institutional dimension to enhance the analysis of real-world 
organizational forms and the theory of the firm. This institutional dimension is conceptualized as an 
“OIE” (Veblenian) “institutional dichotomy” that ranges between “instrumental” cooperative 
networking and “ceremonial encapsulation” (lock-in). Thus, a more comprehensive two-dimensional, 
particularly triangular, organizational space is drafted, which can better map the numerous and diverse 
forms of production and innovation systems, including their emergence as spatial clusters and corporate 
networks. The additional dimension integrates institutionalized network cooperation as “instrumental 
problem-solving”, vs. power and status seeking (by both large hierarchies and fiercely rivalling market 
participants) as “ceremonial dominance”. In addition to ideal market and hierarchy, it provides the ideal 
solution of institutionalized network cooperation, learned in recurrent social-dilemma problems, as a 
third vanishing point and corner. The resulting Organizational Triangle is considered a heuristic for inter-
firm organizational research. As a check of its usefulness, this device is applied to recent developments 
in the global corporate economy. 
(200 words) 
 
Keywords:  Theory of the firm; direct interdependence/strategic interaction; institutional 
emergence/institutionalized cooperation; Coase/Williamson; embeddedness; Veblenian institutional 
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dichotomy; instrumental/ceremonial institutional aspects; spatial clusters/firm networks; open 
innovation; organizational triangle. (10 Keywords) 
 
JEL-Codes:  B52, D02; D23; D85; L14. 
 
 
1 Introduction:  “Markets and hierarchies”, vs. increasing complexity and “third” 
coordination forms 
 
 “Markets and hierarchies”, the long-standing dominating paradigm in industrial and 
organizational economics, has turned out, in face of increasingly complex firm ecologies, of 
increased functional and spatial fragmentation of value-added chains (VAC) and innovation 
systems (IS), to be merely one (dichotomic) dimension, in which firms may realize relative 
advantage through a corresponding coordination of activities. Social rules and institutions, 
i.e., interactively learned, institutionalized (multilateral) cooperative behavior in emergent 
networks (“platforms” of carriers of such institutions), have become another critical 
coordination mechanism. In fact, they had by no means ever vanished in reality with the 
emergence of market exchanges or hierarchical command. Lasting and relatively stable 
cooperative interrelations have always been developing over time, and will usually lead to 
relative coordination advantages in modern environments, but not only so in a static costs but 
more in dynamic advantages (see already Rycroft, Kash 1999; Elsner 2005). 
 
In fact, in real-world VAC and IS more or less intricate incentive structures reflect manifold 
coordination and social-dilemma problems (e.g., technology choice and standardization 
problems, both technological and behavioral, or potential free-riding in innovation processes; 
further, information sharing both inside and among firms etc.), with more than one behavioral 
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option, and with often resulting complex process among many and heterogeneous agents, in 
often nonlinear and cumulative interaction. Increasing complexity, in fact, has tended to 
increase transaction costs (TC), and increased demands on interior and exterior organization 
have resulted (see already North, Wallis 1994). Solving complex problems in process, under 
recurrent decision-making, may lead to some structural emergence, ideally to some 
institutionalization and habituation of cooperative behavior (for an overview of the literature 
on complex systems and the “evolution of cooperation”, e.g. Elsner 2015). 
 
“Markets”, as we are used to call some spontaneous decentralized structure and resulting 
process, then need to be considered particular network topologies rather. Under said intricacy 
and complexity, they usually, and particularly if de-regulated, display adverse individualistic 
incentives in ubiquitous social-dilemma/collective-good problems, resulting in unintended 
negative consequences, lock-in, and other non-solutions, preventing an appropriate and 
required level of collective-action capacity. 
 
And hierarchy, then, is rarely “the” solution as it also has already seen its size and growth 
limits, itself struggling with internal complexity that has grown with corporate size. And 
sourcing-out and globalizing have contributed to spatial and functional fragmentation of the 
VAC and IS, in this way increasing its external complexity and intricacy. Hierarchies have 
ever more become located in complex network topologies (e.g., Bloch, Metcalfe 2013, 85-89; 
also already Hodgson 1998; Elsner 2005; Dietrich, Krafft 2008). Actually, as one 
individualistic kind of “solution”, big corporations proactively have combined networks and 
hierarchy through establishing global multi-layered hub&spoke (H&S) networks. And their 
important value-added branches then are usually re-located in spatial clusters (see below). 
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All these challenges of complexity and intricacy, and often insufficient individualistic 
solutions, do not seem to be properly addressed by an exclusive focus on TC. And when 
addressing observed structures, assuming them as optimal and thus static adaptations, does 
not seem to be sustainable (see already, e.g., Nooteboom 1992). Different network forms that 
reflect different institutional structures can likewise not be explained (e.g., Nelson 2002). 
Appropriate informal institutionalized behaviors and network relations, rather, do play a 
critical role and will be offered here as a separate third ideal mechanism of coordination. 
 
Oliver Williamson, who drafted the New Institutional Economics (NIE) paradigm in the 
context of the “market-hierarchy” dimension, has in fact always considered some complexity 
(e.g., Williamson 1975, 21ff.). However, taking nowadays’ increasing complex ecologies 
serious, there appear to be more ways in which firms address the problems they face in 
modern economies. This has been mirrored in a more significant plasticity and persistent 
diversity of forms, both in interior and exterior firm relations (e.g., Pistor 2012; also Aoki 
2010). And there exist at least said three basic coordination mechanisms for organizational 
systems. Their complex combinations may be one reason that diverse organizational forms do 
persist in parallel in complex firm topologies and dynamics. They are, as to be expected in 
complex adaptive systems, not mainly to be considered “optimal” (static) adaptations to 
given conditions. 
 
In fact, the theory of the firm had already developed in two principal directions, from its 
Coasian origin (Coase 1937). The analysis of factors influencing the size and boundaries of 
“hierarchies” vis-à-vis “markets”, on the one hand, led Williamson towards” hybrid” inter-
firm organizational forms (e.g., Williamson 1975, 1985, 1991). Between the “market” and the 
monopolistic hierarchy, Williamson eventually came to focus on small numbers of firm 
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hierarchies in “markets”, thus oligopolistic structure. And, if exchange is specific and as 
contracting incomplete, thus implying uncertainty and bounded rationality, informally 
cooperative inter-firm exchange that needs to be based on reputation and trust, became center 
stage (e.g., Williamson 1975, 26ff., 106ff., 252ff.). But “market exchange”, even among few, 
remains the normal in that perspective (ibid., e.g., 109), and thus all forms may remain in the 
conceptual framework, and dimension, developed and analyzed somewhere between ideal 
market and ideal hierarchy. 
 
This implication was extensively and critically discussed (e.g., Groenewegen 1996; Amin, 
Hauzner (eds.) 1997), and it was usually referred back to another early post-Coasian 
perspective, focusing on complexity and this dynamic organizational factors (e.g., Cyert, 
March 1992 [1963]; Penrose 1959). In this tradition, Bloch and Metcalfe (2013), among many 
others (e.g., Navarro-Meneses 2015; Aoki 2010; also Hodgson 1996), have recently related 
the embedded firm, with its manifold external interactions and relations, and dynamic 
adaption, as well as the persistent diversity of its objectives and forms, to the complexity and 
often unpredictable dynamics and perceived turbulence, of its environment. Under these 
conditions, firms will, among others, strive for some homeostasis, i.e., for reduced (perceived) 
complexity, for simplification and stability, through some institutionalization of cooperation, 
in more or less intricate decision problems, such as social dilemmas (Bloch, Metcalfe 2013, 
82f., 86f.; also, e.g., Hodgson 1996, 262f.; Navarro-Meneses 2015, 11f.). 
 
In this second vein, the present paper attempts at closing the gap that the Williamsonian 
framework, seems to have left vis-à-vis the firm’s increasingly complex dynamic 
environment. Integrating that second dimension of more or less successful problem-solving 
through institutionalized network cooperation will result in a two-dimensional organizational 
space, with one additional vanishing point, ideal institutionalized network cooperation. This 
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will form an Organizational Triangle. 
 
To conceptualize that originary institutional dimension we refer back to the Original/Old 
Institutional Economics (OIE) paradigm, and particularly to Veblen’s “institutional 
dichotomy” (e.g., Veblen 1899, 1904). Its vanishing points then reflect, at the one end, a 
successful learned and habituated, i.e., informally institutionalized, “instrumental” problem-
solving; which, in turn, we interpret as a solution of ubiquitous repeated social-dilemma or 
collective-good problems in an evolution-of-cooperation vein (e.g., Axelrod 1984/2006). At 
the other end, there is a dominant “ceremonial” status- and power-differentials preservation, 
notably both in fierce “invidious” rivalry (“market”) and in powerful monopoly (“hierarchy”) 
(more below). 
 
This article then proceeds as follows:  In Section 2, we will briefly review the TC approach 
and consider its limits towards complex external structures and dynamics of firms, and the 
institutionalization of their outward behavior. Competence- or resource-based approaches to 
the theory of the firm, also briefly discussed in that section, rather, paved the way for the 
integration of emergent institutionalization of cooperation. We conceptualize the new 
dimension and the Triangle in Section 3 and elaborate on inter-firm relations as 3-tuples of 
“markets”, “hierarchies”, and “networks”. In Section 4, we consider some operationalization 
and apply the new heuristic device to major recent empirical organizational trends in the 
global corporate economy. Section 5 will conclude. 
 
 
2 Theories of the firm:  Coase and Williamson, complexity and dynamics, routines, 
institutions, and relations 
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Transactions:  J.R. Commons (1934) and R.H. Coase (1937) 
The recognition of different kinds and magnitudes of costs related to different kinds of 
transactions had led to a move of the transaction to the center of attention of evolutionary-
institutional (OIE) economists already in the 1920s and 1930s. Conceived of as the basic unit 
of economic analysis, within and among organizations, transactions had helped 
conceptualizing both the anatomy of exchange and the continuity of an organizational space, 
covering market-based, hierarchical, and institutionalized-cooperative ways of executing 
them. Their relevance for understanding economies – in different sets of “rights and duties, no 
rights, and no duties” (Commons) – had originally been developed by J.R. Commons 
(Commons 1934, Vol.I, 55ff.), in an understanding of the firm as an institutionalized “going 
concern”. In this way, the evolutionary-institutional perspective on the firm in its ecology has 
been set for long. 
 
A marginalist understanding of the nature of transactions was then developed by R.H. Coase 
(1937). He underlined the organization of production in general, later summarized by him 
saying that “most resources in a modern economic system are employed within firms, with 
how these resources are used depending on administrative decisions and not directly on the 
operations of the market” (Coase 1992, 714). 
 
Williamson:  Incomplete contract, bounded rationality, and market-hierarchy “hybrids” 
Core assumptions for the further development of the Coasian approach by Williamson were 
complexity, uncertainty, bounded rationality, and opportunistic behavior by agents. 
Incomplete contracts and exchange specificity, with their implications of uncertainty and 
opportunism, particularly of moral hazard and potential hold up, motivated a focus on 
building informal inter-firm relations, with cooperation, reputation building, trust, and 
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relationship-specific investment. Combinations of factors such as uncertainty, asset specificity, 
and the frequency of interactions then served to address such “hybrids” of small numbers of 
firms interacting in “markets” (e.g., Williamson 1991). That is, market exchange among 
hierarchies (how few, how large, how interdependent ever) remains the normal case, and his 
considerations of complexity, uncertainty, emergent informal cooperation and sanctioning 
etc., did not make him move beyond the dichotomic market-hierarchy dimension. That the 
factors shaping TC are numerous and at times hard to capture, was pointed out by Coase 
himself (e.g., 1992, 718). But this has generally been assumed to be of minor importance for 
the basic “market-hierarchy” argument (e.g., Williamson 1985, 1991; also, e.g., Podolny, Page 
1998, 58). 
 
For an illustration of the Williamsonian dichotomic organizational dimension, see Figure 1. It 
indicates that Williamson’s critical assumptions and their implications may easily tend 
towards a different theoretical foundation on a different organizational dimension (the dotted 
arrow) than the one provided by the “market-hierarchy” frame. We have already idealized and 
isolated at the corners the vanishing points “pure” (perfect) “market” and “pure” hierarchy. 
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Figure 1: The Williamsonian market-hierarchy organizational dimension – Illustration. 
 
  
Another dimension, cater cornered to “market-hierarchy”? 
 
 
 Reputation building; informal sanctioning; 
conditional trust; informal cooperation ... 
 
 
“Market”                                                                                                             “Hierarchy” 
 
 
(Transaction costs) 
 Market failure                                   Hierarchy failure  
Ideal 
“perfect” 
market 
(empirically 
void): 
 
Production 
in a maximal 
division of 
labor among 
units of 
minimal size 
(individuals); 
polypolistic 
structure; 
maximal 
competitive. 
 
“Hybrids” 
 
 
Incomplete contracts, asset specificity, 
uncertainty, bounded rationality 
 
 
 
 
 
“Mid-sized” division of labor among “mid-sized” hierarchies; oligopolistic 
structure; “small numbers”; “recurrent contracting”. 
Ideal 
“perfect” 
hierarchy 
(empirically 
void): 
 
Maximal 
vertical 
integration 
of 
production in 
one large 
powerful 
organization; 
purely 
monopolistic 
structure. 
 
The extension towards such hybrids in fact opened up more opportunities than a simple 
“market-hierarchy” duality to analyze production structures. This was Williamson’s historical 
contribution. But, as pointed out for instance by Ménard (2006), the key to keeping “hybrids” 
within the approach of “market- hierarchy” lies in the assumption that observed structures 
were optimal adaptations to circumstances. But this introduced puzzles such as the 
persistence of different structures for the same problems. And such persistence had been 
recognized for long as a prime phenomenon in firm-population and industrial-ecology 
research (already, e.g., Malerba, Orsenigo 1996). 
 
Absorption and learning capacity, internal routines and external relations 
As indicated, Cyert and March (1992 [1963]) as well as Penrose (1959) had already provided 
a post-Coasian approach to firms’ strategic and proactive capacities and scope, and the 
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internal structures and provisions for the external behavior of firms was central therein. Both 
Penrose and Cyert/March drew on internal excess resources behind innovation, opportunities 
for learning, and absorption capacities (also, e.g., Pitelis 2007; Bloch, Metcalfe 2013, 95ff.). 
The importance of learned social rules to maintain outward operability and innovation 
capacity and to structure the relations among firms was addressed here (also, e.g., N. Foss 
1993; K. Foss 2001). Such dynamic capacities are an example that shows that opportunism 
alone will fall short to explain organizational structure (also, e.g., Hodgson 2004). Again, the 
procedural nature of operations and the significance of process became center-stage. 
 
A number of these issues also figured prominently in the explicit evolutionary approach 
offered by Nelson and Winter (1982). They focused on changing market structures, driven by 
differential success in an evolutionary process, which, again, is a result of different internal 
decision rules, so-called routines. Sets of routines, the very structure of firms, will change in 
path-dependent processes. Routines that are more suitable to a given environment increase the 
chance of a firm’s evolutionary survival. On the other hand, they cannot be constantly 
assessed and altered and are inevitably to some degree “path-bound” (Veblen). As a result, in 
changing environments, there is no reason to expect optimal structures at any time, and the 
question of an optimal size for operations becomes moot. This point also Veblen had stressed:  
Rules are inevitably past-bound and, once established, relatively invariable. Therefore, there 
is no reason to believe that existing structures are particularly advantageous, let alone an 
“optimal organizational choice” (also, e.g., Means 1967, xxxv; Berle 1967, xix, xxv; 
Galbraith 2007). 
 
External dynamics vs. rational choice 
Issues of complex dynamic environments have remained insufficiently addressed as well in 
the Williamsonian framework. The ability of a large firm to partly shape its environment 
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means that actual costs and potential costs may diverge. Recognizing the significance of 
process for developing structures, Pitelis (2012) has stressed that costs change as 
organizational structures change – thus, production costs and organization structures cannot 
be treated independently or in a unidirectional causation. A new organizational form will 
change costs of activities over time, in ways that usually are not foreseeable, be they due to 
learning or to market power leading to an ability to influence prices with further cumulative 
impacts. The lack of such complex dynamic between the environment and internal 
developments may impede sufficient understanding of real-world structures. 
 
As such processes may be largely unforeseeable and unintended, they cannot be posited as 
significant for rational choices. For instance, increasing concentration over time suggests that 
industrial production structure entails a tendency towards increasing market power that is not 
due to obvious static TC advantages, but rather to numerous factors. Amongst them, a 
dynamic TC advantage derived from increased market power is but one. 
 
Power has indeed been an aspect in Williamson, as, e.g., asset specificity offers opportunities 
for shifting funds in one’s direction. But it remains unclear how, for instance, a monopoly-
monopsony market and related negotiations can be properly reflected in a frame of 
comparative marginal cost and (boundedly) rational choice. It has indeed been argued that 
using power to influence other agents’ opportunities basically remains outside that framework 
(e.g., Shervani, Frazier, Challagalla 2007). 
 
In one way or the other, repeated interactions and emergent relatively stable relations among 
organizations, with different problem-solving capacities, play a significant role in the 
complexity approach. 
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NIE and OIE perspectives 
Based on such differing conceptions of what are important factors for individual 
organizational entities, their behavior and interactions, two principal approaches to the 
understanding of institutions that contribute to our approach do exist. While NIE, with its 
specific TC-modeling, at least implicitly assumes that risk, calculable for optimal static 
choices, is adequate, OIE, in contrast, considers fundamental uncertainty significant. The role 
of (mostly given and formal) institutions in NIE is to expand the space of possible interactions 
through the reduction of risk, and thus TC, leading to more exchanges becoming worthwhile. 
Analyses of (formal) institutions, legal (property) rights, and suggestions for their change, in 
the sense of an “exogenous”, political institutional design, thus centered on attempts to 
identify the impact of institutions on economic transactions stemming from NIE (e.g., North, 
Thomas 1973; North 1990). 
  
Recognition of strong or fundamental uncertainty in OIE changes the picture. Individual 
behaviors have the potential to generate new future states that were unknown or un-knowable 
beforehand. Information may simply not exist yet at a certain point in time. Strategically 
securing against now-unknowable future states likewise becomes an important factor for 
agents’ decision, in order to reduce their exposure to potentially adverse developments. 
Endogenously changing systems, based on reactions and counter-reactions to changes in the 
socio-economic, technological, and institutional environment result, in a continuing, open and 
open-ended, path-dependent, and idiosyncratic, but also autopoietic (morphogenetic, 
emergent) process. The perspective is on complex structure and interactions (on networks), 
complex dynamics, and on non-optimality. Information will usually be just local. Modeling 
will include positive, often non-linear feedback, multi-agent settings, and related computer 
simulations. 
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The firm then basically is an uncertain, searching, experimenting, and learning, strategically 
interacting agent, striving to gain control over a complex environment, in order to protect 
itself against unknown/unknowable future developments (also, e.g., Galbraith 2007). 
Reducing complexity, stabilizing and adjusting expectations through learning and adopting 
emergent institutions of cooperation, while maintaining the capacity to adapt to new 
situations, becomes the critical capacity of organizational forms in this perspective. 
 
 
3 Emergent institutions of cooperation and the new organizational dimension 
 
A perspective beyond TC-based organizational choice 
In directly-interdependent complex settings, agents cannot know for sure initially, how their 
interaction partners will act. For instance, in a decentralized (technological) standardization 
process, or vis-à-vis a required contribution to a collective good such as a lock-step 
innovation, they are uncertain about their best options, unless they already have gained 
sufficient experience from a history of common interaction and have yielded sufficiently 
stabilized and mutually consistent expectations. They may not even be aware of the whole set 
of behavioral options they have or that are open to their counterparts, let alone of the 
cumulative effect that may emerge from their interdependent decisions. So they are in a 
qualitatively different situation with qualitatively different requirements for their agency 
capacities than in the “market-hierarchy” setting. Search, experimentation, and learning of 
behavior, striving for complexity reduction, and, finally, habituating interactively learned 
long-run collective problem-solving behavior for a potential collective long-run improvement 
become central for their economic success. Firms then usually are modeled as players in inter-
organizational games (e.g., Aoki 2010), often in different kinds of game structures and/or on 
different given initial topologies. 
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The evolutionary-institutional dimension integrated 
Any real firm interacting in a “market”, i.e., on a network topology with more or less intricate 
interdependence structures (typically social-dilemma games in our case), simultaneously also 
exists in a world of complex interdependence structure, process, and emergent 
institutionalization, where social institutions are to be learned and habituated to solve such 
problems. Such ideal institutionalized multi-agent network cooperation that solves ubiquitous 
collective-good (i.e., cooperation) problems now becomes another ideal vanishing point along 
that new institutional dimension, which we consider to run diagonal to the “market-hierarchy” 
dimension. See Figure 2 for an illustration. 
 
[Figure 2 about here.] 
 
This new additional vanishing point is an ideal collective instrumental problem-solving of a 
repeated social dilemma among firms in dispersed production and innovation systems with 
(technological and behavioral) standardization yielded, and innovation and other collective-
good problems solved. 
 
The Veblenian institutional dichotomy (for formal detail, e.g., Bush 1987; Elsner 2012), to be 
stretched into a dimension of more or less successful problem-solving, now provides the 
theoretical foundation for formulating this dimension. At the ideal instrumental end, we find 
social institutions of multilateral (network) cooperation, e.g., a spatial or sectoral culture of 
joint problem-solving in a sectoral or spatial production or innovation system. The perceived 
complexity, turbulence and surprise that an instable, not yet institutionally-settled, 
environment generated before, particularly in dis-embedded, de-regulated “markets”, can be 
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somewhat reduced, expectations stabilized and rendered mutually consistent, social capital 
built as stable interrelations among agents (also, e.g., Burt 2000). 
 
Incapacity of such institutional emergence, under “cultural” conditions of, e.g., 
institutionalized myopia (individualist short-termism), relatively high incentives to defect, 
large, anonymous populations, with high turbulence and high disembedding (uprooting) 
mobility, or in face of a loss of such ability (if already emerged earlier), consequently, is 
captured by an increasing ceremonial content of institutions. At the ideal ceremonial end of 
this dimension, thus, there is a perfectly individualistic culture, focused, in the Veblenian vein, 
on power and status differentials. 
 
This then conceptually connects with the ideal “market-hierarchy” dimension and its two 
earlier ideal vanishing points. This dimension is ceremonial in the sense that it may be either 
highly rivalrous, considered by Veblen (1904) to be “invidious distinction”, ”predation”, or 
“pecuniary emulation”, i.e., the ideal “market”, or monopolistic (“predatory”) power 
maximizing, i.e., the “pure” hierarchy. This end of the new organizational dimension, 
consequently, merges with the ideal market-hierarchy dimension. 
 
As indicated, also an earlier instrumental institution may degenerate into a petrification of 
behavior, a ceremonial encapsulation (Bush 1987) or an institutional lock-in (David 1985), 
when a ceremonial value warrant comes to dominate. Superior individualist power and status 
would then dominate collective “instrumental” problem-solving. The system then would run 
down the institutional dimension from “instrumental” to “ceremonial”. Reasons for the 
deterioration of the problem-solving capacity of institutions and their carrier platforms may 
include 
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• vested interests profiting relatively more over time from an earlier problem-
solving win-win situation, combined with a continued habituation (in fact, 
petrifaction) of the same behavior that was problem solving at the outset, thus, 
increasing inequity of payoffs (e.g., Elsner 2012), or 
• learning curves with decreasing average decision costs of rule behavior based on 
the established institution; potentially superior new institutional structures then 
cannot emerge because the initial cost related to their adoption proves to be too 
high relative to the established (but petrified) institution (e.g., Heinrich, Schwardt 
2013). 
“Adverse” structures are well known in institutional theory and complexity economics, and 
they also apply to the theory of the firm and organization economics (e.g., Hodgson 1993; 
Dosi, Gianetti, Toninelli 1993; Pitelis 1998). 
 
The baseline dimension and its ceremonial content and warrant 
At the heart of the ideal, abstract, and thus empirically void “market-hierarchy” dimension, 
we thus find, in a Veblenian reinterpretation, self-interested a-social agents. Between its two 
vanishing points, where Williamson has dealt with real-world forms, firms may be connected 
by contracts, specifying their respective obligations in a VAC or IS. But as said, a core 
assumption is that whatever is not covered in a contract will be used for advantage at the cost 
of others. This applies not only to cheating, which is standard to asymmetric information 
musings, but also to openly taking advantage of others should contingencies arise permitting 
this. There is thus no room for stable (informal) cooperative relations at that ideal abstract 
bottom line, as all genuinely social aspects of relations are removed from it. There is no room 
for initiative, search for improvement, voluntary contribution, stable reciprocity etc. (already, 
e.g., Groenewegen 1996; Nooteboom 1992; Loasby 2001) – a static and (boundedly) rational 
cost-based choice rather among given organizational forms (competitive or monopolistic) for 
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individualistic agents. As a result, forms along the bottom line are empirically void. The ideal 
“market” can only be expected to be an extreme limit case in the universe of potential real-
world combinations of economic coordination forms, as indicated in manifold formal analyses 
of decentralized systems (e.g., Foley 1998). And the ideal hierarchy, if considered without 
any (informal) institutional coordination, would boil down to a paradox “pure hierarchy”, 
with no single person occupying any of the hierarchical positions as long as to be able to 
develop routines. 
 
Mutuality has not been learned yet (or has broken down again) at the baseline, and is 
conceptually not integrated even in the middle, at “small numbers”. The factors changing in 
their relations during a move along this dimension are the predatory power that fewer 
numbers of agents can exercise over others, and the fierceness of rival and emulative 
interaction. Such dominant ceremonial motivations may be expected to result in mutual 
blockage of any collective effort or innovative behavior under complex and intricate 
conditions as indicated. 
 
In reaction to an increased complexity, volatility and turbulence, particularly in de-regulated, 
highly globalized and highly fragmented markets, firms strive to grow in size and power, in 
order to increase the level of control over the firm’s environment, or regain a former level. 
And as larger economic entities can exert influence and control, including path creation in 
general, the meaning of competition, and competitive pressure and success, has to be 
reconsidered. Increasing control qualifies what at first is usually thought of as superior 
competitiveness (i.e., advantage in the cost structure in an environment of price competition 
and price-based allocation). In complex, evolutionary and cumulative process, however, 
alleged superior competitiveness and higher efficiency may well turn out to be an effect of 
superior size and power, and complex constellations may easily entail the survival (the 
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differential replication) not of the fittest, but of the fattest, the first, or of all (e.g., Nowak 
2006). 
 
The firm and its relevant VAC or IS, its relevant firm population, group, sector, industry, 
cluster or network, would move down the vertical dimension, the more de-regulated, fierce, 
and turbulent the rivalry among hierarchical competitors would become. On this way, the 
system may also turn more to the lower right, with increasing concentration, centralization, 
power, and control. Aspired superior status and power, more control aspired over each one’s 
rivals, redistribution, free riding, predatory habits and exploitation would have to be expected 
to come to the fore. 
 
At the ceremonial end of the institutional dimension, there will be no approach to properly 
deal with the complexity of real-world situations. Agents then will not have developed any 
culture of recognized interdependence (e.g., Bush 1999) or futurity (Commons 1934; for these 
critical factors in the evolution-of-cooperation approach, e.g., Axelrod 1984/2006; Elsner, 
Heinrich 2009), a general striving for short-run extra gains would dominate a culture of long-
run institutionalized behavior of cooperation, which would require sacrificing that very short-
run maximum. 
 
But again, real-world coordination forms, resulting from complex systems and including 
emergent structure, qualitatively differ from both ideal market and ideal hierarchy, and from 
the ideal hybrids of the baseline dimension (e.g., Powell 1990; Winter 1993; Hodgson 2005; 
Baudry, Gindis 2005; Dietrich, Krafft 2008). 
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As this also applies to the third vanishing point and, by analogy to the left and right edges, 
only the inner space of the Triangle, illustrated by the dotted lines in Figure 2, is empirically 
relevant and accessible. 
 
The inner space of the Triangle 
Thus, when conditions allow for some learning process, a move of the system away from the 
baseline upwards into the interior of the Triangle will reflect combinations of some degree of 
(1) institutionalized cooperation, combined with some degrees of (2) hierarchy and of (3) 
decentralization and significance of prices, the “market”. This will mark the area of real-
world organizational forms, as we cannot reasonably assume an institutions-free environment 
in reality. Exchange and transactions are, in the real-world, inevitably embedded in some 
institutional context. Thus, in our empirically non-empty organizational space, excluding the 
edges of the triangle, there only exist 3-tuples of hierarchy-network-market. There is no 
“market” or “hierarchy” in the real-world that would not receive meaning and sense, and 
workability, from some institutional base (as a classic of this institutional(ist) perspective:  
Neale 1994). 
 
Note that boundaries of the firm then do play a role in this institutional space as well. Not in a 
perspective of contracting in markets (outsourcing) or in hierarchies (insourcing) but in the 
perspective of exchanging learned and habituated thought, knowledge, and behavior, together 
with products and personnel (with their own knowledge and behavior). Here firm boundaries 
often blur (more below). 
 
As the instrumental warrant increases in an inter-organizational culture, and firms 
increasingly solve intricate collective problems through informal institutions of cooperation, 
also general trust will co-evolve, in a set of overlapping and layered institutionalized 
21 
platforms of carriers of institutions, themselves being of appropriate meso-sizes, where the 
cognitive conditions for emergent cooperation are sufficiently favorable (e.g., Elsner, 
Schwardt 2014; Castro et al. 2014; more below). 
 
In the institutionalist tradition, the instrumental content of socio-economic systems has been 
operationalized through elaborating the so-called social value principle (e.g., Tool 1985, 
1986). But we will not delve deeper into operationalization here (more below). 
 
Degrees of instrumentality:  Network structures and innovation capacity 
In VAC and IS, innovation capacity is of course not necessarily or naturally high, as in 
production and innovation manifold collective-good problems always linger on. For instance, 
innovation entails a combination of existing knowledge into something new, and integrating 
the knowledge of agents signifies an extension of the relevant knowledge base. Structures 
then have to be established to guarantee the adequate flow of knowledge among agents. This 
will always entail a lasting trade-off between making short-run maximum of one’s 
information and generating the long-run operability of the collective process, including a 
longer-run individual improvement. If conditions are sufficiently nontransparent, there will be 
a dominant incentive to avoid one’s contribution (in terms of R&D costs, information sharing 
etc.) and assume a free-rider position, when the agent in an IS cannot be excluded form a 
general information flow. Co-evolving structural patterns that enable cooperation, thus, are 
likely required for individual and collective long-term success (e.g., Nelson, Winter 1982; 
Beinhocker 2008; Elsner, Heinrich 2010; Matutinovic 2010). 
 
Again, on the one hand, this is a question of platform size. On the other hand, it is a question 
of network structure. A centralized network, where all information has to flow through a 
central node (hub), an H&S network, will result in a powerful central player controlling the 
22 
ability of others to interact and, thereby, may lead to some limitation of the overall innovation 
potential. In contrast, informally institutionalized decentralized contacts among the members 
of a production network may shorten ways and time required, and help its functioning, 
flexibility, and innovation performance (e.g., Helper, Sako 2010; for an overview, e.g. 
Beinhocker 2008). 
 
Some network structures display particularly effective properties, and thus received particular 
interest from both social network analysis and network design:  The well-known small-world 
networks (e.g., Watts, Strogatz 1998) combine meso-sized clusters with their high potentials 
of institutional emergence of cooperation, with a number of long-distance relations among 
them that ensure that the whole structure has a relatively short average path-length between 
any two agents so that new information may diffuse through the whole system relatively fast. 
Here, obviously, some agents will have a higher degree of centrality, i.e., power and 
hierarchical position, than others, where network designers would have to be aware of. 
 
In sum, for analyses of complex production and innovation systems, in terms of their 
problem-solving capacities, the specific structures composed of the particular properties of 
“markets” (prices), hierarchy (commands), and networks (institutionalized reciprocity) are 
natural starting points, mirrored by the Triangle. And social network analysis will be a natural 
way to further develop the organizational space conceptualized here. 
 
 
4 Depicting real-world organizational trends in the wider organizational space 
 
(1) Blurring firm boundaries 
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As said, VAC/IS do assume a variety of forms and structures, responding to different paths 
their interaction processes have taken (e.g., Wright, Mukherji 1999). This entails differences 
in the boundaries of the organizational entities, including hierarchies in “markets”, with 
arm’s-length relations and prices playing some role, further spatial clusters, and firm 
networks. However, it has been observed over the last decades that boundaries of firms 
increasingly blur under forms of informal institutionalized cooperation, particularly in highly 
innovative and dynamically cooperating spatial production and innovation systems (as a 
classic, e.g., Saxenian 1994), and that such close reciprocity relations have become 
increasingly crucial for innovating firms’ “high-road” developments (e.g., Dosi, Salvatore 
1992; Amin, Hauzner 1997; Hodgson, Knudsen 2000; Kay 2000). With this, we would 
conceptualize some movement upwards in the Triangle (see Figure 3, Trend 1). 
 
[Figure 3 about here.] 
 
(2) Spatial clustering 
For further conceptual qualification of the organizational space, other reference points may be 
located at the edges for a better orientation in the space. Another ideal organizational form 
that integrates spontaneous decentralized exchange with (still) some role for prices (i.e., 
“markets”), but transactions taking already place in some increasingly stable relations, is 
spatial clusters. It is, thus, ideally located “halfway” between ideal market and ideal 
institutionalized network on the left edge. We consider such local/regional clusters informal 
coordination forms, ideally emerging from “markets” under (perceived) complexity 
conditions, as spatial organizational forms of firms in a Marshallian sense of industrial 
agglomerations, in order to deal with and reduce complexity and to stabilize expectations and 
behavior, reflected by repeated, relatively stable, lasting and increasingly price-resistant 
exchange relations that is becoming institutionalized to some degree (often with agents not 
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being even aware of that) (e.g., Elsner 2005, 2010). According to Alfred Marshall (1890), 
cluster display and practice some informal labor and supplier “pooling”, while shared 
“information is in the air”. In fact, nowadays high-tech firms are caring for their high value-
added and highly innovative branches and plants to be located in (or relocated into) 
effectively interacting specialized clusters. The empirical literature on this is nearly infinite, 
and we cannot delve deeper into this here. Just note that with this tend firms are moving with 
their high value-added plants towards the “halfway” left hand of the Triangle. (Figure 3, 
Trend 2). 
 
(3) Open-source networking 
Strategic firm networks then are more deliberately agreed forms of multilateral, often project-
based and fix-termed institutionalized cooperation, often emerging from the above cluster 
interactions among a subset of cluster firms. Institutionalized cooperation behavior appears to 
be even stronger and often more formal in a strategic network than in a cluster. But also, such 
networks often do not have the spatial limitations that clusters have (although they also need 
to care for face-to-face meetings to remain productive) (again, e.g., Elsner 2005, 2010). 
Against this characterization, and as generally argued throughout this paper, network forms 
generally are to be located in the upper part of the Triangle. 
 
A development that comes close to the ideal networking with fully shared-information flows 
and collective-good contributions has been the “open-source” movement in software 
development. This has also been extensively analyzed (e.g., Raymond 1999; Lerner, Tirole 
2002), and we will not delver deeper into it here. Open source and open innovation have 
indeed developed from the limited early “hacker” and programmers scene far into the 
“normal” commercial firms world. 
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Under original open source, individual reciprocal contributions to the collective good would 
become the predominant institutionalized behavior, and information and expectations become 
fully common (for an empirical case study of the Linux networks on the background of the 
Triangle, see Elsner, Hocker, Schwardt 2010). Note that such ideal movements would be 
conceptualized to approach the upper angle of the Triangle (Figure 3, Trend 3). 
 
(4) Flatter hierarchies and increasing control through H&S networks 
A trend that has also been long-established and well-analyzed is that large hierarchy, still a 
prime tool for increasing control over a firm’s environment and to compensate for increasing 
complexity and turbulence under de-regulated globalization, has tended to be reduced and 
made flatter over the past decades to reduce internal complexity. This was due to increasing 
difficulties in managing larger hierarchical systems of many interrelated units. But this 
obviously did not out-compete larger entities by smaller ones, smallness over bigness, 
flexibility over power, etc. Rather, control has increasingly been exerted through more 
network-based forms, in face of ever more complex VAC/IS, towards new combinations of 
interior hierarchies and exterior networks (e.g., Armstrong 2001; Perraton, 2001; Choi, Hong 
2002; Elsner 2005; Vitali et al. 2011). Resulting global H&S networks may be multi-staged, 
with distributions of firms’ sizes and firms’ centralities, and even sets of distributed hubs. In 
this way, the central hub and assembler firm (the final brand firm) may command hundreds of 
firms and many hundred thousand laborers worldwide. Contracting out will also shift risks of 
volatility to smaller, formally autonomous units. Also, it helps improving financial indicators 
in a more short-run stockholder-financialization regime (e.g., Lazonick 2010; Milberg, 
Winkler 2013). 
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As a combination of hierarchy and network, the ideal H&D network would have to be 
conceptually located half-way on the right-hand edge of the space, and with the above trend, 
we would register a move towards it in the Triangle (Figure 3, Trend 4). 
 
(5) An emergent narrow network of dominating financialized entities 
As a final example, a most critical and dominating development in the today’s financialized 
global corporate economy is its centralization into around forty leading financial-industrial 
mega-powers. According to the so far largest recent corporate network analysis, this forms a 
relatively closed network of mutual ownership and personal interlocks, each commanding 
several multi-layered H&S networks with hundreds of firms each, in total representing the 
largest parts of the world economy. This analysis covers the 40,000 largest firms and is based 
on the largest corporate data set ever (an ETH Zurich study: Vitali et al. 2011; for 
institutional(ist) classics on a corporate power-based “planning” networks with capital and 
personal interlocks, e.g., Berle, Means 1967; Galbraith [1967] 2007; Munkirs 1985; Hayden, 
Bolduc 2000). 
 
In the Triangle, this development would mean a move to the lower right (see Figure 3, Trend 
5). The strong ceremonial content, in a Veblenian vein, would stem from the fact that they 
have the full set of instruments available to network at the expense of third parties and the 
general public (transfer pricing and tax evasion, price coordination, mergers and acquisitions, 
collusion, entry deterrence, lobbying and rent seeking etc.). 
 
In order to operationalize such trends in the Triangle, we might refer again to the Veblenian 
theory of institutional change and some “index of ceremonial dominance” developed therein 
from network analyses (e.g., Bush 1987; Hayden, Bolduc 2000). But again, we will not delve 
deeper into operationalization and measurement issues here. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
As Coase stated, “the relationship which governs the mix of market and hierarchy … [is] 
extremely complex, and in our present state of ignorance it will not be easy to discover what 
[the] factors are” (Coase 1992, 718). This paper has argued that the most critical of those 
factors can be captured only through a systemic and complexity approach, integrating a 
complexity-governing (institutionalized problem-solving) dimension with the “market-
hierarchy” dimension into an extended organizational space. 
 
Thus, we have proposed a two-dimensional organizational space conceptualizing real-world 
direct interdependence, complexity, and dynamic process, to get beyond the ideal “market-
hierarchy” frame based on marginal calculus. We strive to extend the analytical scope to 
address the larger and persistent variety of real-world organizational forms. Ubiquitous 
interdependence, and coordination and cooperation problems render stand-alone firms and 
arm’s-length market interactions of relatively limited utility for the analysis of organizational 
forms. 
 
We have “idealized” the Coase-Williamson dimension to an empirically void limit and 
referred to the OIE (Veblenian) institutional dichotomy to capture emergent institutionalized 
organizational network forms on a new, second dimension, the end-points of which again are 
ideal and empirically void extremes. While the “ceremonial” end of this dimension connects 
with the idealized Coase-Williamson “baseline”, the other “instrumental” end constitutes a 
third ideal angle of the now unfolding Organizational Triangle, ideal institutionalized 
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cooperative networks. Ideal spatial clusters and ideal H&S networks further characterize the 
(empirically void) edges of the Triangle. 
 
Any real-world and empirically accessible organizational form, then, appears as a 3-tuple of 
(1) spontaneous decentralized mechanisms, where prices play some role (“markets”), (2) ideal 
structures of superior-inferior command relations (“hierarchies”), and (3) interactively learned 
informal institutionalized cooperation forms dealing with complex environments and intricate 
decision structures, emerging as multilateral networks solving, better or worse, the complexity 
challenge. We have defined the inner space of the Triangle as the empirically relevant space 
and have, for illustration purposes, allocated some well-known real-world trends of 
organizational development in the Triangle (blurring firm boundaries; spatial clustering; open 
source/open innovation; global H&S networking of large corporations; and emergence of a 
global level of few interlocked and networking financial-industrial mega-entities), to illustrate 
its empirical accessibility. 
 
Our exercise seems to provide an opportunity to advance the analytical capacity in the field. It 
opens the space for integrating the real-world variety of forms into an organizational space. 
Systems of production, of information, and of innovation, and intricate technological 
standardization and open innovation problems center on the increasingly significant real-
world forms of clusters and networks. This also marks the inevitable institutional 
embeddedness of both market and hierarchical transactions. 
 
So while the additional dimension provides meaning for an increasing embeddedness of firms 
in general, its ceremonial direction also demonstrates possible dis-embedding options. 
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The TC dimension does not remain untouched by the new conceptualization:  Instrumental 
institutionalized network relations relations will improve the ability to lower TC. That such 
relations, however, also may deteriorate over time, towards an institutionalization of status- 
and power-based “ceremonial” values, implies regular evaluations of structures and their 
problem-solving potentials. 
 
Proper institutional design of organizational triples in support of improved problem-solving 
action capacities may then become mandatory for an (enlightened) public-policy agent. The 
Triangle appears to be able so far to support our understanding of processes by tracing 
changes as movements through its empirically accessible interior space. 
 
As explained, social network analysis and related index measures, together with further 
operationalization of the “instrumental value principle”, are considered natural directions to 
further elaborate this so far only conceptual approach. Issues of operationalization and 
empirical measurement must be left to future research. 
(6,820 words) 
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Figure 2: An “Organizational Triangle” with ideal benchmark organizational forms – 
Illustration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increasing monopolistic power of a single agent within the VAC/IS 
Increasing competition as “invidious distinction”, “predation” and/or “pecuniary emulation” 
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Figure 3: The current main move in the real-world global corporate economy:  Towards a 
narrow power-based oligopolistic network of multi-layered H&S networks (after 
Vitali et al. 2011) – An illustration in the Organizational Triangle. 
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